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Abstract 
The notion of affordance has been introduced by Gibson (1977, 1979) as the feature of 
an object or the environment that allows the observer to perform an action, a set of 
“environmental supports for an organism’s intentional activities” (Reybrouck 2005). 
Studied under very different perspectives, this concept has become a crucial issue not 
only for the ecological psychology, but also for cognitive sciences, artificial intelligence 
studies, and philosophy of mind. This variety of approaches has widened the already 
ambiguous definition originally provided by Gibson, contributing to the development 
of different standpoints in open contrast with each other (see Zipoli Caiani 2011). Dur-
ing the last two decades, moreover, many researchers tried to extend the notion also 
to musical experience, aiming to draw a coherent theory of musical affordances (e.g. 
Clarke 2005; Nussbaum 2007; Krueger 2011a; 2011b). In this paper, we will argue for a 
particular concept of musical affordances, that is, as we see it, one narrower and less 
ambiguous in scope and more closely related to its original. Taking the discovery of 
canonical neurons as our starting point, we will (i) introduce the general notion of 
affordance, (ii) discuss some significant contributions in this area of research, mostly 
focusing on musical affordances and (iii) propose a motor-based interpretation of mu-
sical affordances. 
Keywords: musical affordances; canonical neurons; motor intentionality; musical un-
derstanding; embodied music cognition.  
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Visual-motor affordances and the power of action 
In the context of motor action research, there is a common agreement
52 regarding a 
basic understanding of the notion of affordance, usually intended in terms of a set of 
possible motor actions evoked by the intrinsic properties of an object or the environ-
ment. According to Gibson (1979), indeed, the visual perception of an object leads to an 
automatic  selection  of those  of  its  intrinsic  properties  that  support the  individual’s 
physical interactions with it. These properties, however, are not only abstract, physical 
or geometrical features, but „incarnate the practical opportunities that the object of-
fers to the organism which perceives it” (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2006: 34). When, for 
example, an object like a cup is located in the subject’s peripersonal space (Costantini 
et al. 2011), it can represent the goal of the individual’s grasping act and this sub-
ject/object interaction is codified through an affordance. A key role for this current 
understanding  is  played  by  the  neuroscientific  evidence  of  canonical  neurons  (Riz-
zolatti et al. 1988; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 1998; Rizzolatti et al. 2000; Raos, et al. 2006; Umiltà 
et al. 2007; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2008), a set of neurons which discharges when an 
individual simply observes an object without performing any movement, as well as 
when he/she grasps that object. The selectivity of these neurons, appreciable through 
the congruence between the codified motor features and objects’ visual properties, 
advocates for their pivotal role in the process of transforming the visual information 
of objects into the appropriate motor acts (Jeannerod et al. 1995). The discovery of 
these “visuo-motor” neurons shows how an object can afford, according to the sub-
ject’s motor expertise, a set of possible actions that can be performed thereon, relying 
on  a  sub-cognitive  form  of  understanding,  not  linked  to  mental  representation  or 
higher mental faculties. Gallese (2009), in describing the canonical neurons, states that 
[t]he most interesting aspect […] is the fact that in a considerable percentage of 
neurons, a congruence is observed between the response during the execution of a 
specific type of grip, and the visual response to objects that, although differing in 
shape, nevertheless all “afford” the same type of grip that excites the neuron when 
executed […].The intrinsic relational functional architecture of primates’ motor sys-
tem likely scaffold the development of more abstract and detached forms of inten-
tionality, as those characterizing thought in our species (Gallese 2009: 489-490). 
The basis of the intentional relationship between an organism and the environment, 
therefore, can be reconsidered in terms of how the motor possibilities (Poincaré 1908; 
1913) of the subject’s body can interact with the surrounding objects, advocating for a 
motor approach to intentionality (Sinigaglia 2008). This form of intentionality doesn’t 
require any high-level, metacognitive ability as “the intentional character, the ‘about-
ness’ of the representational format of our mind could be deeply rooted in the intrinsic 
relational character of body action”. (Gallese 2009:  489). In other terms, cognition can 
be seen as embodied, namely, it arises from the bodily interactions with the environ-
ment, depending on “the kinds of experiences that come from having a body with par-
ticular perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably linked and that together 
form the matrix within which memory, emotion, language, and all other aspects of life 
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are meshed” (Thelen 2001: XX). However, notwithstanding the importance of this new 
embodied paradigm (see also Merleau-Ponty 1945; Varela et al. 1991; Gallese 2011), the 
current ecological account for affordances inspired by Gibson seems to be character-
ized by epistemological vagueness. Indeed, one of the assumptions at the basis of this 
perspective is that every set of behaviours ascribable in terms of a unitary action has the 
right to be described as an act potentially evoked by its related affordance. In order to 
clarify this statement we can think about the possible analogy
53 between these two 
different conditions: (i) a cup affords the act of grasping and (ii) the sight of a movie-
trailer affords the act of going to the cinema. From an ecological standpoint, those ac-
tions (grasping and going to the movies) are both homogeneous and describable as 
unitary. But the inferential feature of the second one makes it unsuitable: otherwise, 
every a-posteriori correlation between events and actions should be considered affor-
dative. To get an idea of the variety of phenomena included under the concept of af-
fordance we can indeed have a look at this excerpt from E.J. Gibson (1982): 
Air,  the  medium  we  live  in,  affords  breathing.  It  affords  walking  or  driving 
through, and seeing through, at least in communities that are free of smog (Gib-
son 1982: 55). 
This example presents some incongruences with the necessary setting of a scientific 
research on the notion of affordance. Even if sometimes the air is breathable, this does 
not imply that breathing is a goal-directed act, intentionally linked with the portion of 
air considered as an intentional object (Menin 2011: 12). We cannot indeed integrate 
every possible interaction between the two poles of action (subject and object) into a 
genuine reflection on the issue of affordances without applying a rough objectivation 
(see Husserl 1901; 1907; 1936), hence depriving the notion from any phenomenological 
characterization.  The  relationship  between  a  subject  and  the  air  that  the  agent  is 
breathing cannot be described as cognitive, or as constituent of any intentional rela-
tionship. It can only be described in terms of physical-chemical events
54. But if some 
events do have affordances, we should investigate the object of these, and also the role 
of the relevant subject, considering the coding of perceptual information with regards 
to the motor knowledge of the perceiver, as the aforementioned literature on canonical 
neurons clearly states. In the realm of music, the concept of affordance – far from be-
ing successfully addressed yet – has been investigated during the last few years in or-
der to clarify the subject/object relationship characterizing musical experience, with a 
particular emphasis on the surrounding, sound-made environment. What does music 
afford? How can a subject make sense of a series of sounds intended as musical? Which 
                                                             
53 This example has been presented firstly in Menin 2011. 
54 With regard to this point, we claim that the original Gibsonian ambiguity needs to be explicitly overcome, 
if we are to develop an experimentally expendable notion of “affordance”. If it is true that one of the most 
fascinating features of affordances resides in its being direct and someway “automatic”, thus not requiring 
any cognitive or attentional mediation, we cannot go, on the basis of this not-needed mediation, to the ex-
tent of saying that no intentional sensorimotor relationship is required for an affordance to take place. The 
notion of “basic motor act” introduced in the recent literature (e.g. Rizzolatti, Sinigaglia 2008) clearly high-
lights goal-directedness as the central feature of sensorimotor interactions. 
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modalities are involved in this sense-giving process? The current body of knowledge in 
this area is extremely broad, and besides the obvious interest of music researchers, it 
does involve scholars from different backgrounds. Hence, the following section pre-
sents some of the trends in the current debate, providing incentive for further discus-
sions as well. 
 
Musical affordances in current literature 
In  this  section  we  try  to  take  a  closer  look  at  the  notion  of  musical  affordances, 
focusing on the works by Clarke (2005), Nussbaum (2007), Krueger (2011a; 2011b), and 
Reybrouk  (2005),  probably  the  most  influential  and  well-known  studies  on  this 
specific and problematic issue.  
Ways  of  Listening  by  Eric  F.  Clarke  (2005)  aims  to  face  the  problem  of  musical 
understanding  through  a  Gibsonian  interpretation  in  order  to  overcome  the 
interrelated  dichotomies  of  subjects/objects,  passive/active  listening  and 
autonomy/heteronomy  of  musical  experience.  However,  as  we  try  to  show,  the 
epistemological caution necessary in dealing with such a complex body of problems is 
not always fully addressed. The author firstly suggests that musical structure is not a 
construction within the mind, but, rather, something inherent in the environment, 
with  which  our  auditory  system  would  resonate.  Secondly,  Clarke  describes  the 
dynamics of these resonances, introducing the key notion of affordance (36) without 
rigorously discussing the problematic aspects implicit in the controversial Gibsonian 
concept.  Two  of  the  most  quoted  excerpts  of  Clarke’s  book  help  highlighting  the 
consequences  of  this  option,  elucidating  what  kind  of  phenomenic  topography  is 
included in his notion of musical affordance. 
Music  affords  dancing,  worship,  co-ordinated  working,  persuasion,  emotional 
catharsis,  marching,  foot-tapping,  and  a  myriad  other  activities  of  a  perfectly 
tangible kind (Clarke 2005: 38). 
In  the  specific  contexts  of  musical  hermeneutics,  musical  material  can  be 
conceived  as  affording  certain  kinds  of  interpretation  and  not  others  [...]. 
Interpretation is also action – the speaking, writing, gesturing and grimacing in 
which interpretation is manifest [...]. The recapitulation of the first movement of 
Beethoven's  Ninth  Symphony  affords  writing  (or  speaking)  about  in  terms  of 
murderous  sexual  rage,  or  the  heavens  on  fire.  Interpretative  writing  and 
speaking are forms of action (204). 
Looking at the examples provided in the first list, allegedly belonging to the class of 
perfectly tangible acts that can be afforded by music, we can notice the same incon-
gruities we have previously reported about Gibson’s standard account: mainly, the 
lack of any consistency in the conceptual and phenomenological structure of the pro-
vided concept of affordance. It is indeed problematic, for instance, to assume that mu-
sic is in some way the intentional object of all this variety of behaviours. Moreover, 
the second excerpt shows Clarke’s bias to equate percepts and concepts (Nonken 2008), 
objectifying the class of musical acts, intended only from an a-posteriori point of view. A Remedy called Affordance 
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From this standpoint, there is no substantial difference between the way music affords 
foot-tapping and the way it affords writing pieces of musical criticism. With regard to 
this point, someone could argue that Clarke is not actually confusing percepts with 
concepts, but rather trying to unify our understanding of perceptual and cognitive 
aspects of musical experience. Our objection, however, remains valid. Indeed, if this 
holistic stance is one of Clarke's main concerns, it is quite clear that he treats this posi-
tion as a claim and as a presupposition at the same time, hence giving rise to a circular 
argument. In conclusion, the meaning of to afford which emerges from Clarke’s Ways 
of Listening does not exceed the colloquial concept of to evoke, or to elicit, showing that 
musical experience is, in a vague sense, evocative. The book’s main conceptual contri-
bution, besides its remarkable general introduction to ecological psychology and mu-
sical understanding, indeed, could be summed up as a rather direct application of a 
standard ecological account to the study of musical experience, broadly intended.  
More ambitious is the theoretical proposal of Charles Nussbaum (2007) who actually 
aims to unravel the riddle of musical experience (2007:  XI) in light of its representa-
tional nature. To understand the problem he is dealing with, we can first have a look 
at this citation:  
It takes only a small amount of perspicacity to realize that music is remarkable, 
indeed an astounding, phenomenon. The emergence of human musical experience 
from  the  audition  of  organized  tones  remains  deeply  puzzling,  truly  “a  riddle 
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” a riddle, moreover, of very long standing 
(Nussbaum 2007: XI). 
In our opinion, this statement is highly misleading, especially with regards to the set of 
problems involved in musical understanding. The apparently naïve implication that 
musical  experience  builds  up  from  the  auditory  perception  of  analytically  isolable 
basic elements is not only unwarranted, but it also stands in open contradiction with 
the most fruitful studies of action-related aspects of perception (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 
2008: 50-52).  
If we are to unravel the riddle of musical experience, we need a thread on which to 
tug. Construing music as representational, as a symbolic system that carries ex-
tramusical content, I hope to persuade you, exposes such a thread (1). 
As  this quotation clearly shows, the enigmatic position of the musical problem and the 
representative option proposed in the book are closely interrelated. This epistemologi-
cal situation does present analogies with the post-Cartesian dilemma concerning the 
emergence of a thinking substance from an extended body: in both cases, the hyposta-
tisation of the starting dichotomy necessitates an ad-hoc solution in order to mediate 
between the two substantialised realms. It is worth to note, with regard to this topic, 
that the notion of affordance is usually connected with a strong anti-dichotomist posi-
tion, as Gibson (1976: 129) first pointed out. In Nussbaum’s work, however, an affor-
dance is conversely meant as a mediation tool, functional to the perpetuation of a radi-
cally dualistic stance. Indeed, according to this scenario, musical affordances are con-
sidered to be conceptual bridges between a low-level dimension of musical experience, 
conceived in terms of a meaningless isomorphic transcription on a pitch-time diagram AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
207
of the stimulus, and an idealised high-level dimension that includes every aspect of 
musical experience, broadly meant. Even without discussing the proposed theoretical 
framework, we can rule out Nussbaum’s contribution as irrelevant to our aims, as he 
considers affordances to be a cognitive form of understanding, linked to mental repre-
sentation or higher mental faculties, thus in contrast with any position developed from 
an ecological standpoint. 
Another approach aimed at developing a sustainable notion of musical affordance is 
provided by the recent works of Joel W. Krueger (2011a; 2011b). The author claims 
that “an affordance is a relational property of the animal’s environment perceived by 
that animal as having a functional significance for that animal” (Krueger 2011a: 4). He 
also states that music is perceived from birth as an affordance-laden structure that 
affords a sonic world (Krueger 2011a:  1) that further affords possibilities for, among 
other things, (1) emotional regulation and (2) social coordination. From an epistemo-
logical standpoint, however, this proliferation of affordative levels seems – at least – 
suspicious, and gives rise to three questions: 
(i)  Does music afford a sonic world in the same sense as this sonic world affords 
emotional regulation?  
(ii) What would be the relevance of such a claim in the study of the intentional re-
lationship between a subject and a musical object? 
(iii)   How should we describe the animal-environment relationship if music affords 
a sonic world that further affords acts of any type?  
In trying to answer these questions, we find out that the mediation offered by the no-
tion of “sonic world”, besides being unnecessary, if coherently implemented would 
substantially compromise the direct character of the concept of affordance, explicitly 
acknowledged by Krueger (2011a: 7). Moreover, the mainly homeostatic (emotional 
and social-related) conception of the activities elicited by musical experience seems to 
divert from the embodied approach that the author claims to embrace. Besides these 
issues,  the  crucial  point  of  Krueger's  argument  is  the  characterization  of  musical 
space, developed in league with the tradition of spatiality-for-action(e.g. Poincarè 1908; 
for a TMS study, see Cordellicchio et al. 2011) mainly discussed in the visuo-motor do-
main (Rizzolatti et al. 1997; Sakata et al. 1997). In his paper Doing things with music 
(2011a), Krueger faces the problem of musical space from a purely ecological stand-
point,  defining  musical  environments  (or  sonic  worlds)  as  comfortable  or  stressful, 
whereas in his other work,  Enacting musical content (2011b), he does contrast inner 
(or structural) and outer musical space. Outer musical space is here identified with the 
localisation of the occasional sound source, whereas inner musical space is described 
as “the piece’s inner syntactical structure established by the way that constituent com-
ponents (e.g. tones, rhythmic progressions, etc.) go together, lending the musical piece 
its sonic coherence as a composed object” (2011b). Since outer space is meant as non-
musical (related to the localisation of musical stimulus), we would assume that inner 
space  and  sonic  world  are  interchangeable  notions,  defining  from  different  stand-
points the same musical space for action. But this assimilation is hardly accomplish-
able. The notion of sonic world arises indeed from a standard ecological standpoint, A Remedy called Affordance 
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while the concept of inner space descends from a – at least to our knowledge – misun-
derstood embodied approach, in which the musical surface is identified with a Carte-
sian diagram with time and pitch as axes, embracing de facto the “pharmaceutical 
model” (Sloboda 2005: 319) of musical understanding which Krueger explicitly refuses 
(Krueger 2011a: 3). As a result of this irreducible duality of approaches, the notion of 
affordance connected to the concept of sonic world seems extremely relational, as it is 
associated with every kind of activity that music could possibly elicit, whereas the one 
connected to the concept of inner space is conceived from a completely objectivistic 
point of view. What both of these concepts are missing, in our opinion, is the inten-
tional character needed to make musical affordances a phenomenologically relevant 
notion. 
A better awareness of the range of issues implicit in the enactive approach to human 
musicality is shown by Mark Reybrouck (2005),who addresses in his work for an em-
bodied characterization of musical experience. The author, using syncretic integration 
of  different  perspectives  (from  classic  pragmatism  to  cognitive  economy),  aims  to 
overcome the prevailing objectivism in the realm of musical understanding, by apply-
ing the key notion of sensorimotor coupling (which defines the perception-action loop) 
to  the  analysis  of  this  topic.  His  strategy  consists  in  defining  the  two  domains  of 
(i)musical experience and (ii) motor cognition, showing how they can be connected in 
such a coupling. “Musical experience”, he claims, “is not basically different from an 
auditory experience at large. It is continuous with the natural experience or experi-
ence proper (see Dewey 1934) with a difference in degree rather than in quality” (Rey-
brouck 2005: 9). This equivalence between experience proper and aesthetically con-
noted perceptionjustifiesthe application of a general concept as sensorimotor coupling 
to the peculiar realm of musical understanding, considering the importance of action 
in acoustic perception (Kohler et al. 2002). On the other hand, the processes of motor 
cognition are introduced through the discussion of the pivotal notion of ‘image sche-
mata’, defined as “recurring, dynamic pattern[s] of our perceptual interactions and 
motor  programs  that  give[s]  coherence  and  structure  to  our  experience”  (Johnson 
1987:  XIV). The two classes of image schemata presented as the most relevant to the 
study  of  musical  experience  are  the  “container  schema”  and  the  “source-path-goal 
schema”. While the container schema is “a pervasive mode of understanding everyday 
experiences in terms of ‘in’ and ‘out’” (Johnson 1987:  12), the source-path-goal schema 
represents the feature of being oriented towards a goal in a continuous, temporally 
extended path (Johnson 1987:  12).The author then illustrates the musical analogies of 
these image schemata, introducing the concept of “musical affordance”: 
There are, as yet, many possibilities that stress the “action aspect” of dealing with 
music. I mention five of them: (i) the sound producing actions proper, (ii) the ef-
fects of these actions, (iii) the possibility of imagining the sonorous unfolding as a 
kind of movement through time, (iv) the mental simulation of this movement in 
terms of bodily based image schemata and (v) the movements which can be possi-
bly induced by the sounds (Johnson 1987: 24). 
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In discussing Reybrouck's contribution to the topic of our enquiry, we have to firstly 
acknowledge its rare pertinence to the range of problems related to embodied stances 
and the study of musical experience. Furthermore, Reybrouck's work clearly exceeds 
the limited topic of musical affordances, so our observations are not meant to refute 
his general proposal. That being said, we also have to express some concerns about the 
robustness of the conceptual framework developed, with particular regard to the topic 
discussed herein. In particular, the choice of defining separately the two realms of 
musical experience and motility seems weak, considering that Reybrouck himself ac-
knowledges non-objectivism as one out of the two main claims defining an embodied 
approach (10).With  regard  to this  topic,  we  propose  a  different  option  in  the  next 
paragraph. Moreover, the two definitions proposed appear to be questionable: indeed, 
as Clarke (2006: 1) pointed out, one of the dichotomies that a notion of musical affor-
dance could help to overcome is that which opposes autonomy and etheronomy of mu-
sical experience, but the full integration of musical experience into mere acoustic ex-
perience proposed by Reybrouck seems to neglect this aspect.  On the other hand, the 
notion of image schema and the actual schemata proposed could not be accepted by 
many proponents of embodied cognition (see Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2008), as these 
concepts seem to individuate a class of mental schemata, rather than a truly embodied 
kind of sense-making. This problem emerges clearly from the analysis of the notion of 
“goal” provided by the author: indeed, the kind of goal-directedness described by Rey-
brouck cannot be assimilated into the classic motor grounded one (see, for instance, 
Murata et al. 1997; 2000, for a focus on acts such as prehension). However, it does pre-
sent similarities with the teleological stance theory advocated by the Theory-Theory 
supporters such as Csibra and Gergely (2003), where the understanding of the others’ 
intentions and goals can only be possible from an external, ascribing, perspective (see 
also Dennett 1987). 
 
Musical affordances through the motor perspective 
In order to overcome the epistemological inaccuracies just portrayed, we propose, in 
the realm of music, to consider a musical affordance to constitute a property of the 
intentional relationship between musical subjects and objects. Indeed, the scenario 
described at first  advocates  for  a  new phenomenological  characterization (Pelinski 
2005; Schiavio 2012), where the intentional understanding constitutes the (musical) 
object of perception in regard to the motor repertoire (Rizzolatti et al. 1988; 2000; Buc-
cino et al. 2004; Gangitano et al. 2004; Calvo-Merino et al. 2005; 2006) of the listener 
(Molnar-Szacaks, Overy 2006; Overy, Molnar-Szacaks 2009; Bangert et al. 2006; Lahav 
et al. 2007). This pivotal role of the body and its motor knowledge has been addressed 
in the phenomenological equivalence between perceiving and giving sense to the per-
cept (Merleau-Ponty 1945), where  
 
 
 A Remedy called Affordance 
 
210
my body is geared to the world when my perception offers me a spectacle as var-
ied and as clearly articulated as possible, and when my motor intentions, as they 
unfold, receive from the world the responses they anticipate. This maximum dis-
tinctness in perception and action defines a perceptual ground, a basis of my life, a 
general  milieu  for  the  coexistence  of  my  body  and  the  world  (Merleau-Ponty 
[1945] 1962 : 250). 
Rather than postulating high-level cognitive abilities to account for understanding, the 
phenomenological  explanation  provided  requires  only  my  body,  conceived  as  “the 
meaningful core which behaves like a general function” (46). A skilled guitarist might 
be unable to say where to put her/his finger to perform a solo, but s/he can use the 
motor knowledge of the fingers to reconstruct the actual set of notes played, by just 
putting the hand on the strings. We believe that this sensory-motor process not only 
represents the basis of musical understanding, but it can also shed light on the notion 
of musical  affordance,  relying  on  a  sub-cognitive,  pre-linguistic,  intrinsically motor 
form of intentionality. In particular, the studies on the ontogenetic basis of musicality 
can provide some evidences of a non-cognitive characterization of the subject-object 
relationship of musical experience. Indeed, for instance, despite avoiding an explicit 
reference to the notion of affordances, the work of the French psychologist Francoise 
Delalande (2009) provides a discussion with a genuine and motor-based approach, in 
league with the anti-mentalistic stance at the basis of the recent thematic rediscovery 
of affordances. Trying to make sense of the ontogenetic constitution of a musical con-
text from the sensory-motor exploration in infants, the author focuses on the dynam-
ics of these sound-based objects’ discoveries (see also Perone et al. 2008; Schiavio & 
Menin 2011). Indeed, when a child explores the environment and produces sounds, 
these  sounds  may  surprise  her/him,  leading  the  infant  to  hear  and  produce  them 
again, maybe introducing some variations (see Imberty 1983). This process of repeti-
tion with slight changes can be seen as the development of a sound discovery, whose 
characterization, rather than cognitive, is represented by the advance of the sensory-
motor modalities of interaction with the object (Delalande 2009: 300). This ontogenetic, 
sense-giving and motor-based process reflects the constitution of the intentional rela-
tionship of musical subjects and objects, the only plausible scenario where musical 
affordances can be observed in infancy. This account for musical intentionality, hence, 
leads the discussion on the analysis of musical-related acts, chains of actions with a 
musical  goal-directedness  (teleomusical  acts
55)  constituting  the  musicians’  motor 
knowledge. Indeed, a correct characterization of these acts cannot be limited to the 
executive side of motility, because what allows the possibility of understanding a mu-
sical object in terms of its evoked acts (Overy & Molnar-Szakacs 2009: 492) is the goal 
rather than the actual performed movement (Kohler et al., 2002; Ticini et al., 2011). 
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Conclusions 
The scientific contributions we briefly reviewed were supposed to clarify the concep-
tual  topography  around  the  notion  of  affordance,  dealing  with  the  specific  sets  of 
events related to human musicality. Unfortunately, in our humble opinion, none of the 
above mentioned authors seems to have shed light on the nature of musical affor-
dances. We therefore argued against the fitness of the presented theoretical frame-
works to consistently make sense of the number of problems implicit in this notion by 
proposing an embodied approach that radically diverges from the standard accounts, 
considering musical objects as entities constituted within the intentional motor-based 
relation that defines a musical context (see also Schavio 2012). If musical affordances 
are properties of the intentional relationship between a musical object and a musical 
subject,  as  we  have  assumed,  the significant  consequences  we can  draw from  this 
theoretical  paradigm may have  repercussions  in  the  ontogenetic  studies  on  human 
musicality, as well as addressing the need for new models of musical learning. The 
situatedness  of  musical affordances,  indeed, as  it  is  rooted  in action-understanding 
processes rather than in mental forms of the transmission of knowledge, cannot be 
decontextualized  from  the  subjective  goals  (Barab  &  Roth  2006),  advocating  for  a 
teaching approach mostly based on the development of the individual’s (musical, mo-
tor-expressive) intentions (Young 2004b) through a strategic study of the relevant (mu-
sical-directed)  motivations  (Merleau-Ponty  1945).  As  we  have  seen  in  the  preview 
paragraph, in fact, what motivates children in exploring the environment and produc-
ing sounds primarily emerges as a spontaneous behaviour completely immersed in a 
bodily-based intentionality. Spontaneous exploratory activities are firstly focused on 
directing attention outward toward events, objects and their properties, and the layout 
of the environment (Gibson 1988). Through the manual exploration of objects, infants 
develop their motor acts and familiarize themselves with musical structures such as 
repetition and variation. The knowledge acquired from those discoveries will make 
the children able to construct a musical context as well as a basic vocabulary of musi-
cal-directed acts (simple sound-oriented actions such as  plunging, hitting, scratching 
(Delalande 2009) can be seen as examples). From this standpoint, the notion of musical 
affordance, correlatively with the key concept of music-directed (or teleomusical) acts, 
becomes then crucial for understanding the ontogenetically originary elements of mu-
sic experience, and the processes that lead to their development to a fully constituted 
musical – embodied – intentionality.  
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